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  The cooperatives play a decisive role in the agriculture and rural development in 
developed countries. In contrast, China’s agriculture currently encounters the 
contradiction between “the mini farmer vs. the great market” during its modern 
transformation. Therefore, there is practical significance to study the cooperatives. 
  Generally considered, the principles of cooperatives which International 
Cooperative Alliance outlined are universal. However, it is surprisingly that there is 
hardly any formal economic model to proof the rationality of the cooperative 
principles so far. Therefore, there is academic significance to study the principles of 
cooperatives as well. 
  The conventional wisdom in academic theory takes the cooperatives as enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the old view is on the basis of the paradigm of enterprise’ contract, 
which cannot explain the principle of cooperatives that-each man could vote for one 
bill for democratic control in the cooperatives. These articles put forward a new 
theoretical framework for the cooperatives. These articles take the cooperatives as 
social contracts. The core principles of cooperatives are their characteristics in steady 
state path in the framework of dynamic general equilibrium. The paradigm of 
enterprise contract often uses the game theory to study such problem above, but the 
game theory often gives the multiple equilibriums. So it will not be able to predict the 
unique equilibrium result in repeated games if using the concept of game equilibrium 
to describe such problems. These articles uses the framework of dynamic general 
equilibrium, which could avoid the problem of multiple equilibriums. 
  The cooperatives’ value lies in whether to help raise the income level of its 
members or not. So the empirical research of these articles used examined the income 
impact of cooperatives on –their members by the surveys of the agricultural enterprise 
clusters in Zhangpu Country and the cooperatives in the other six counties of Fujian 
Province. Different power relationship between capital and labor in the microstructure 
















These articles find that there is no significant effect on the improvement of income for 
family member through joining the cooperatives, but the income effect of the 
regulating degree of cooperatives is positive significantly. Besides, there is no positive 
income effect of capital controlled agricultural enterprise on local farmers.  
  These articles studies the precise relationship between the cooperatives and 
government based on the mathematical model of the economics. The government 
funding does not affect the level of capital stock in equilibrium path. But the amount 
of capital can accelerate the cooperative moving on the equilibrium path. When the 
cooperatives are subject to the cash-in-advanced condition, it is of special significance 
for the liquidity value that the government funding provided. The government would 
incentive the cooperatives to improve their regulating degree which is also equivalent 
to a “rank-order tournament” among the cooperatives. The principles of cooperatives 
must be time consistence in order to ensure the maximization of social welfare in the 
dynamic path. The support of government for the cooperatives should be less material 
and more institutional. 
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第 1 章  导论 
 
1.1  本文研究的现实意义 
 



























































世界上 富的 5%的国家的人均收入是 穷的 5%的国家的人均收入的 34 倍，而
富的 5%的国家的农业人均产值是 穷的 5%的国家的农业人均产值的 78 倍，
与之相对的是，非农业领域中， 富的 5%的国家的人均产值仅是 穷的 5%的

















































































品占农产品总量的 80%，合作社提供的合肥、石油占 44%，贷款占 40%。在法
国，由合作社收购的农产品，牛奶占 50%以上，谷物占 71%。法国食品出口中，
通过合作社出口的谷物占 45%，鲜果占 80%，肉类占 35%，家禽占 40%。在日
本，市场销售农产品绝大部分是由农协提供，其中米、面占 95%，水果占 80%，
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